INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring. Much of the literature on repeated games assumes that players can observe public (possibly imperfect) information regarding other players' past actions. However, this paper assumes that, at the end of every period, each player observes an imperfect signal regarding hisÂher opponents' actions for that period, and that this signal is private information.
Situations where information regarding the behavior of other agents remains private would appear to be important in a number of economic settings. The``secret price cutting'' in Stigler [20] is an excellent example. In each period, each firm in an oligopolistic market with differentiated goods chooses a price for its product. Since each firm has a chance to offer its customers secretly a lower price than the announced one, the firms are unsure about the actual prices their rivals have chosen. Each firm's sales during the period, which are privately observed by the firm and are determined by actual prices and unobservable stochastic shocks to demand, provide information on pricing behavior of the other firms. In this example, sales can be seen as privately observed imperfect signals of the other firms' actions because the sales depends partly on unobservable stochastic shocks.
Alternatively, suppose that two people have made an agreement to exchange their goods produced in each period. In each period's production, each person has an opportunity to make a costly investment to improve the quality of his goods. Realized quality depends on the investment decision and on unobservable stochastic shocks. The players can observe only the realized quality of the goods they receive. In this example, quality is an imperfect private signal of the opponent's investment decision and the situation is somewhat like a prisoner's dilemma; the two people have no incentive to make the costly investments when the trade is one-shot.
This paper analyzes a repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring such as that described above. The main result of this paper is that there exists a sequential equilibrium with (average) payoffs arbitrarily close to those of cooperation, provided that the stage game payoffs satisfy some conditions, signals convey correct information in most cases, and players are patient. In other words, near efficiency can be achieved in these cases.
In previous literature, there are other attempts to obtain near efficiency in private monitoring situations. Radner [18] shows an efficiency result, and Lehrer [14 16 ] provides further characterization of the equilibrium payoff set, both assuming no discounting on players' payoff functions. Fudenberg and Levine [9] prove a Folk Theorem and therefore near efficiency, using a notion of approximate equilibrium as a solution concept, which requires only =-rationality and is thus weaker than Nash equilibrium or its refinements. However, the assumption of no discounting is implausible in that players' payoffs are not affected by any change in outcomes within finite periods, however long these may be. Likewise, =-rationality is implausible because deviations within quite long periods are ignored when players are very patient, as such deviations have little effect on players' average payoffs. Therefore the assumptions of no discounting or =-rationality are not a good approximation to the case of discounting and perfect rationality. As for the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring and discounting, Compte [6] obtains near efficiency, too. However, Compte [6] assumes that defection is irreversible: once a player defects, he must defect in all subsequent periods, and thus Compte does not analyze usual repeated games. Therefore this paper is the first to provide a class of repeated games with private monitoring that have a nearly efficient equilibrium without those restrictive assumptions. Now we briefly survey the previous literature on repeated games with private monitoring and discounting. On the one hand, Matsushima [17] attempts to derive an anti-Folk Theorem for such games. He shows that when strategies available to players are confined to those that satisfy a certain requirement of informational efficiency, any Nash equilibrium of repeated games with private monitoring must be a repetition of Nash equilibria of the stage game. On the other hand, Kandori [12] and Bhaskar [4] show the existence of Nash equilibria other than repetition of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. They assume, however, that the stage game has a mixed strategy equilibrium (Kandori [12] ) or multiple equilibria (Bhaskar [4] ), which prevents us from applying their results to more general stage games, including the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, the equilibria constructed there are not fully efficient: the average payoffs of the equilibria neither lie on nor are close to the Pareto frontier of the feasible sets of the stage games.
Therefore the previous literature on repeated games with private monitoring and discounting does not show whether (nearly) efficient outcomes can be achieved as Nash or sequential equilibria, while Folk Theorems are obtained in repeated games with public information on other players' past actions. 1 Now we briefly explain why the cases with private monitoring are hard to analyze. In repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players directly observe other players' past actions, subgame-perfectness requires that the continuation strategy profile after any history be a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Similarly, in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, where all players observe the same signal on the actions chosen by them, if players use strategies that depend only on these public signals, then sequential rationality requires that the continuation strategies after any history of public signals constitute a sequential equilibrium. Thus such games have a recursive structure in that the same solution concept applies to all continuation games, and so one can apply the dynamic programming method developed by Abreu [1] and Abreu et al. [2] to these games.
In contrast, repeated games with private monitoring do not have such a recursive structure. To see this, suppose a strategy profile is an equilibrium, and consider a history in which player 1 deviated from the strategy. After that history, player 1 computes his belief about other players' continuation strategies taking his own deviation into account, but the other players compute their beliefs presuming that their opponents follow the equilibrium strategies without deviation. Thus the continuation strategies do not constitute any kind of equilibrium in general when a deviation has occurred. This is the lack of recursive structure that prevents us from applying the dynamic programming method to repeated games with private monitoring.
Our result, existence of a nearly efficient equilibrium for some kinds of prisoner's dilemma with small imperfectness of signals and patient players, has two implications. First, we can demonstrate a kind of robustness of cooperation in repeated games. Theories on repeated games have created the idea that economic agents who are engaged in long-run relationships can achieve efficient outcomes. However, as is described above, previous literature has not shown the possibility that efficiency might still be achieved in private monitoring cases. In that sense, we were previously unsure as to whether the possibility of cooperation is robust with respect to changes in the monitoring structure. Though restricted to certain kinds of prisoner's dilemma, this paper shows that such cooperation is still possible, despite the change.
Second, we can now consider the significance of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. Compte [4] and Kandori and Matsushima [12] show that a Folk Theorem can be obtained when players are able to communicate with each other about their privately observed signals in each period. 2 While they show that communication is sufficient to sustain cooperation, this paper shows that it is not always necessary. Moreover, economic agents often confront the situation where communication is prohibited; in the secret price cutting model, the antitrust law can be considered as such an example. Therefore the analysis of the case without communication is important not only theoretically but also practically, and this paper shows that efficiency can be obtained in such cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 shows existence of a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium for certain types of prisoner's dilemma, given small imperfectness of signals and patient players. Section 4 concludes.
THE MODEL
The stage game is as follows.
which is a stochastic variable, after choosing the action. Both the chosen action and the observed signal cannot be observed by the other player; namely, the signal is private information.
Let ?(| | a) be the probability that a signal profile | # 0=0 1 _0 2 is realized, given that an action profile a # A=A 1 _A 2 is chosen. We hereafter call the event where a player observes c (or d, respectively) despite that the other player chose D (or C)``error''. We assume that, for any action profile, the probability that an error occurs to one particular player but not to the other is p 1 and that the probability that an error occurs to both players is p 2 , where p 1 # (0, 1), p 2 # (0, 1) and 1&2p 1 & p 2 >0. For example, when a=(C, C), we have
and so on. Notice that the situation is close to perfect monitoring when p 1 and p 2 are close to zero. We will concentrate on such situations later.
The above assumptions are quite general except that the probability of each type of errors is independent of action profiles and symmetric in that the probability that an error occurs only to player 1 is always equal to the probability that an error happens only to player 2. 3 In particular, they include both the case with independent signals ( p 1 and p 2 are written as p 1 =z(1&z) and p 2 =z 2 for some z # (0, 1)) and the case with highly correlated signals.
Each player's payoff depends on the action she chose and the signal she observed and is written as u i (a i , | i ) (i=1, 2). We assume that the players' payoff functions are identical and ordered as in a prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, after normalization we have
where G>0, L>0, and 1+G&L<2.
Given a # A, player i's expected payoff when players choose an action profile a is f i (a)= :
When p 1 and p 2 are small, f 1 ( } ) and f 2 ( } ) are ordered as in a prisoner's dilemma. That is,
In these cases, we can normalize f 1 ( } ) and f 2 ( } ) as depicted in Fig. 1 . Formally,
.
When possible, we will mainly use the normalized payoffs in Fig. 1 as stage game payoffs. We consider infinitely repeated games with discounting where the stage game described above is played in each period t=1, 2, 3, .... Signals observed in each period are private information and there is no way for the players to communicate with each other about the signals. We assume that occurrence of signals is independent over time. We denote the repeated game with private monitoring by G( p, $ ), where p=( p 1 , p 2 ) and $ # (0, 1) is the players' common discount factor. In this game, a history for player i at period t (t 2), denoted h t i , is a sequence of player i's past actions and
as an arbitrary singleton set. A behavior strategy for player i in G( p, $ ) is a mapping from t=1 H t i to a probability distribution on A i . We denote the set of strategies for player i in G( p, $ ) by 7 i (i=1, 2).
Given a strategy profile _=(_ 1 , _ 2 ) # 7 1 _7 2 , player i 's average expected payoff is
where f i ( } ) are employed as stage game payoffs. E[ } | _] means expected value with respect to the probability distribution of action profiles induced by _, and a(t) is the realized action profile in period t.
EXISTENCE OF A NEARLY EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we prove our main result, existence of a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium for some kinds of prisoner's dilemma with small imperfectness of signals and with patient players. Before stating the result, we briefly sketch the idea of the proof.
To begin with, we define some strategies. Let _ C # 7 i (i=1, 2) be the strategy such that _ C (h 1 i )=C and, for t 2,
, and let _ D # 7 i (i=1, 2) be the strategy in which player i plays D regardless of histories. In other words, _ C is the grim trigger strategy. And let _* be the strategy that mixes _ C and _ D so that the opponent is indifferent between _ C and _ D . Such _* exists when the players are not too myopic and when signals are accurate to some extent.
Since the signals are noisy, the player playing _* eventually starts to play D forever, which may make strategy profile (_*, _*) inefficient. However, when $ is relatively small, it may be a nearly efficient outcome because the payoffs in the distant future are unimportant. As is proved later, this is indeed true because the probability of _ D in _* is small for such $. Then we can also obtain a nearly efficient outcome in the case with $ close to one, by modifying (_*, _*) as follows: we divide the original game into N distinct games, the first of which is played in period 1, N+1, 2N+1, ..., the second of which is played in period 2, N+2, 2N+2, ..., and so on. Then the effective discount factor of the divided games, $ N , is so small that playing (_*, _*) in each divided game achieves near efficiency.
Thus it suffices to show that (_*, _*) is a Nash equilibrium for small $, and it is shown through the following method, which we call path dominance. Given a history for a player at some period on the path induced by a given strategy profile, we check whether it is optimal for the player to play the action in that period prescribed by the strategy. In other words, we consider optimality of the current action given the history, instead of optimality of the whole continuation strategy. To this end, we compare the payoff obtained by conforming to the given strategy with an upper bound of payoffs obtained by deviating at least in that period. If the former is larger than the latter, then the continuation strategy dominates all continuation strategies induced by a current deviation, which proves the optimality of the current action. Note that it is easier to compute an upper bound than the maximum of the payoffs. And optimality of current actions at all histories on the path implies that the given strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
Of course, a Nash equilibrium does not satisfy sequential rationality in general. In our model, however, any Nash equilibrium has a sequential equilibrium with the same path. This is because any player's information set off the equilibrium path must follow the player's own deviation. A formal proof is given in Proposition 3.
To sum up, we try to find a nearly efficient Nash equilibrium using pathdominance at first and then to find a sequential equilibrium with the same path, instead of finding such a sequential equilibrium directly. As we have seen in the Introduction, it is difficult to find sequential equilibria in our model because the model lacks a recursive structure. As time passes, the players accumulate a lot of privately observed signals, by which they form beliefs on continuation strategies of the others given a strategy profile. As a result, the players would have quite complex belief systems, and one can hardly expect that the original strategy is in fact a best response to such complex belief systems. On the contrary, it is relatively easy to find a simple Nash equilibrium strategy profile because it requires best response property only on the equilibrium path, which can be proved by a path-dominance argument. This is the reason our method works better. Now we begin with some preliminary results. The following proposition is a key to our path-dominance argument. Since we are interested in the case with small p 1 and p 2 , we consider G( p, $ ) with stage game payoffs given by Fig. 1 . Proposition 1. Suppose l> g 2 and $ # (gÂ(g+1), (g+l)Â(2g+l+1)) in G( p, $ ). 5 Moreover, suppose that player i believes that the probability that player j 's continuation strategy is _ D is q at some history at period t.
Then, given the history, it is not optimal for player i to play C in period t if q 1Â2.
Proof. Given the belief, playing C in period t gives player i at most (1&$)(&ql+1&q)+$(1&q)(1+ g), while playing D from period t on gives him at least (1&$)(1&q)(1+ g).
Since $ # (gÂ( g+1), (g+l)Â(2g+l+1)) and q 1Â2, the difference is
Q.E.D.
Although Proposition 1 does not cover the case with $ close to 1, the next Proposition, which is due to Ellison [7] and is reproduced here for the reader's convenience, ensures that we can restrict attention to the case considered in Proposition 1. . Now we divide the repeated game G( p, $ ), where $ $ Ä , into N($ ) distinct repeated games, the first of which is played in period 1, N+1, 2N+1, ..., and the second of which is played in period 2, N+2, 2N+2, ..., and so on. Since each repeated game can be regarded as one with discount factor $ N($ ) , playing the sequential equilibrium of G( p, $ N($ ) ) which gives more than & for both players in each divided repeated game constitutes a sequential equilibrium of G( p, $ ) with average payoffs more than &.
The next proposition describes the relationship between Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Proposition 3. Let _=(_ 1 , _ 2 ) # 7 1 _7 2 be a Nash Equilibrium of G( p, $ ). Then there exists a sequential equilibrium of G( p, $ ) which has the same path as _.
Proof. Define a function { i : t=1 H t i Ä A i as follows. Choose t and h t i # H t i . Given h t i and _ j , we can compute the belief about player j 's continuation strategies by Bayes' rule. Finiteness of the stage game and discounting imply that there exists an optimal pure continuation strategy given the belief (see Fudenberg and Levine [8] for the details). Choose such a continuation strategy and define { i (h t i ) as the action it assigns in period t.
Let H i (i=1, 2) be the set of histories for player i of G( p, $ ) which can be observed with positive probability given _. Now we define _^=(_^1 , _^2)
It is easy to show that _^i is a best response to _ j .
Suppose player j plays _^j . Player i 's system of beliefs given _^j is the same as that given _ j . Thus _^i is sequentially rational given _^j and the system of beliefs, and the system of beliefs is of course consistent. Since it is easy to show that _ and _^have the same path, _^is the desired sequential equilibrium.
Using these results, we can now prove our main result, existence of a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium for a repeated prisoner's dilemma with a certain assumption on stage game payoffs, small imperfectness of signals and patient players.
Theorem. Suppose L>G 2 . Then for any =>0, there exist pÄ >0 and $ Ä # (0, 1) such that G( p, $ ), with stage game payoffs given in Fig. 1 , has a sequential equilibrium whose average payoffs are more than 1&= if p 1 +p 2 pÄ and $ $ Ä .
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. The assumption L>G 2 is necessary because of the following reason. Consider the strategy profile (_*, _*). In order that it is a Nash equilibrium for small $ and small probabilities of errors, it must be that _ D is an optimal continuation strategy when h t i =[(C, c), (C, c) , ..., (C, c),
If we also assume that occurrence of signals is independent among players, the likelihood of an event mainly depends on the number of errors it includes. Given h t i , there are two distinct events which includes exactly one error. The first is the one that d observed in period t&1 is an error and player j's continuation strategy is _ C . The second is that player j observed d, an error, in period t&2 and switched to _ D in period t&1. Notice that any other event compatible with that history must include more than one error. This implies that player i believes that player j plays _ D with probability as large as 1Â2. For _ D to be optimal in this case, the short-run losses of playing C in period t must be large, and therefore $ must not be too large. On the other hand, $ must be large for players to cooperate. The assumption L>G 2 ensures the existence of such a moderate $.
Remark 2. We also assume that probabilities of errors are independent of action profiles and are symmetric. Without these assumptions, errors to player i can be much more likely than those to player j. Then, in the case described above, player i may conclude that the d observed in period t&1 is the only error and that player j plays _ C from now on, and therefore (_*, _*) may fail to be an equilibrium. Thus the assumptions are important, but we can obtain efficiency even in cases which violate but are close to the assumptions. In this respect, the theorem is robust to changes in monitoring structure.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that a nearly efficient outcome can be achieved as an equilibrium for some kinds of prisoner's dilemma even when players' information about their opponents' past behavior is private. In this section, we briefly discuss on possible extension and limitation of our result.
One drawback of the result of this paper is that it holds only for a limited class of prisoner's dilemma. One can, however, obtain a similar efficiency result for general repeated prisoner's dilemma, by assuming additional assumptions on the structure of private monitoring. Suppose that, because of, for example, improvement in monitoring technology, probabilities of errors are decreasing over time. That is, any type of error in period t is more likely to happen than that in period t$ if t<t$. Under this monitoring structure, suppose (_*, _*) is played and player i confronts history h t i =[ (C, c), (C, c) , ..., (C, c), (C, d )]. As was described in Remark 2 of the Theorem, there are two events which can be equally likely from player i 's viewpoint if monitoring structure in each period remains the same. Since probabilities of errors are decreasing, however, player i tends to put more weight on the event that an error occurred to player j in period t&2 and player j 's continuation strategy is _ D , which makes it likely that (_*, _*) is an Nash equilibrium for a broader class of repeated prisoner's dilemma. Indeed, in Sekiguchi [19] , it is shown that near efficiency is obtained for any given repeated prisoner's dilemma when players are patient and probabilities of errors exponentially decrease.
Our result depends on the following special feature of the prisoner's dilemma: the action corresponding to a profitable deviation from the Figure 2 cooperative phase is the same as the one used to punish deviators. Therefore we can apply our result to stage games where the profitable deviation from``cooperative'' behavior is unique for each player and the actions corresponding to the deviations constitute a Nash equilibrium which is Pareto inferior to the cooperative behavior; for example, to the n-person prisoner's dilemma with monitoring structure that is a natural extension of the one presented in this paper. However, the following example shows that it does not apply to other stage games.
Suppose
. Expected stage game payoffs given an action profile are shown in Fig. 2 and signals are independent among players. According to our result, one natural candidate for an equilibrium strategy is to mix the grim trigger strategy and the strategy where D is always played. Suppose player 2 plays the mixed strategy and h t 1 =[(C, c), (C, c) , ..., (C, c), (C, e)]. The only event which contains only one error and is compatible with h t 1 is that player 2 chooses the grim trigger strategy and the e observed in period t&1 is an error. Therefore, given h t 1 , player 2 continues playing C with high probability when probabilities of errors are small, thereby inducing player 1 to play C in period t. Thus player 1 does not have an incentive to follow the grim trigger strategy given player 2's strategy. In this stage game, while the only profitable deviation from a cooperative behavior (C, C ) is E for each player, (E, E) is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and so we cannot apply our result to this case.
So we cannot say whether it is possible to support a nearly efficient outcome as an equilibrium in general stage games. In addition, we are not sure what will happen when the probabilities of error are larger. We hope further research will be undertaken in these directions.
APPENDIX
Proof of the Theorem. First, notice that when p=0, g and l defined in Section 2 are equal to G and L. Therefore, by continuity, the assumptions G>0, L>0, 1+G&L<2, and L>G 2 imply that there exists p^>0 such that g>0, l>0, 1+ g&l<2, and l> g 2 if p 1 + p 2 p^. In view of Propositions 2 and 3, it suffices to show that there exist pÄ >0, $ 0 , and $ 1 such that 0<$ 0 <$ 1 <1 and that G( p, $ ), where p 1 + p 2 pÄ and $ # [$ 0 , $ 1 ], has a Nash equilibrium whose average payoffs are more than 1&=.
We define & :; ( p, $ ) (:=C, D, ;=C, D) as a player's average payoff in G( p, $ ) when he plays _ : and his opponent plays _ ; . Then we have
,
and
Now we define a function q as
q( p, $) is defined so that player i is indifferent between _ C and _ D when player j plays _ D with probability q( p, $ ) and _ C with probability 1&q( p, $). Fix =>0. Since q((0, 0), gÂ( g+1))=0 and & CD ((0, 0), gÂ( g+1))=1, we can choose $ 0 and $ 1 , where gÂ( g+1)<$ 0 <$ 1 <( g+l )Â(2g+l+1), such that 
Let _* # 7 i (i=1, 2) be the strategy where player i plays _ D with probability q( p, $ ) and _ C with probability 1&q( p, $ ). Associated with _*, we define + i (h t i ) as follows. Suppose that player j plays _*. Then, for any player i 's history h t i , player i can compute the belief on player j's continuation strategies given the history. Let + i (h t i ) be the probability that the belief assigns to _ D .
Next, we define functions r and s as 
and , c), (C, c) , ..., (C, c)], it is optimal for player i not to play D in period t.
Using Bayes' rule, we have
Then p 1 + p 2 1Â3 and (3) prove (A).
If
, the probability that h t i occurs and player j's continuation strategy is _ C is
because player j must choose _ C the d observed in period t&1 must be the only error. And the probability that h To prove (C), suppose h t i =[ (C, c), (C, c), ..., (C, c) ]. The probability that h t i occurs and that player j's continuation strategy is _ C is   (1&q( p, $) where the first inequality follows from (4) . Therefore, it is not optimal to play D in period t. This proves (C). Thus (_*, _*) is a Nash equilibrium of G( p, $ ) when p 1 + p 2 pÄ and $ # [$ 0 , $ 1 ], and its payoffs are at least (1&q( p, $)) & DC ( p, $ )>1&=,
by (1) and (2), which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
